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Francçis Le Guay* 
After outlining some of the most harmful effects of the 
present crisis, the writer describes two theoretical ways 
out of it: the liberal capitalist and the social democratic. 
Although the second way seems to him more pro-
pitious for the future development of the countries of 
Latin America, he argues that even this way will be 
inadequate unless it is accompanied by the establish-
ment in these countries of an independent and self-
sustained pattern of development. 
During the 1970s, both within and outside the re-
gion, many theoretical and practical ideas were elabo-
rated with respect to this new pattern of development, 
ideas which were pushed aside by the revival of liberal 
economic doctrine. These ideas remain valid in the 
writer's view, so that the problem now is not to create a 
new model but to incorporate an operational element 
into the notion of independent and self-sustained de-
velopment, especially in certain key areas such as food 
self-sufficiency, the introduction of an increasingly 
independent industrialization process and the de-
velopment of the industrial and farming sectors. 
In seeking to introduce this operational element 
into theories for the transformation of the prevailing 
style of development, it is also necessary to confront 
the question of planning, which should be capable of 
making a more effective contribution to the orienta-
tion of the process as a whole. Foremost among the 
aspects of planning which need improvement are the 
integration of time horizons, the meshing of global 
with sectoral planning, and the development and con-
solidation of the processes of social harmonization. 
Finally, the writer asserts that neither was there any 
shortage of ideas, of research or even of suitable in-
stitutions in the field of integration at the subregional 
as well as the regional levels; the causes of their short-
comings and failures should rather be attributed to the 
lack of political will to put them into effect, as was 
demonstrated by the scant progress made with in-
dustrial and energy integration. 
•Professor at the University of Grenoble and the Institute 
of Advanced Latin American Studiesat the University of Paris. 
I 
Some reflections 
on the effects of the crisis 
The most striking manifestation of the crisis 
—the extraordinary level of indebtedness of the 
majority of the countries— was the focus of in-
ternational attention for many months. After the 
meeting of the International Monetary Fund in 
September 1984 there was a relative silence on 
the matter. According to official sources, the pro-
duction of ad hoc solutions for each case (the case 
of Mexico is the prime example) smoothed over 
the problem, and the international financial sys-
tem survived the major danger without the need 
for far-reaching structural changes. This view 
appears to me excessively optimistic. Even with 
respect to the purely financial aspect it seems to 
me to be very difficult to argue that the present 
situation, with its enormous net financial flows 
from the countries of the South to the countries 
of the North, can be maintained for many more 
years. 
More important than the financial aspects, I 
think, are the actual effects of the crisis on the 
economic systems and social and political struc-
tures of the developing countries. Taken as a 
whole, Latin America has passed through three 
years of serious recession (1981-1983), and the 
growth of 2.5% in the gross product in 1984 does 
not even equal the population growth. The aver-
age standard of living has been put back 10 to 20 
years, depending on the country. 
What is even more serious is that the crisis 
has profoundly affected production systems. In 
some countries and in some sectors of industry 
and agriculture it has led to the abandonment of 
productive capacity and to technological 
backsliding and dispersal of skilled labour. This 
deterioration will make it very difficult to achieve 
rapid growth in certain sectors, even if the de-
mand situation improves. 
The social impacts have also been very severe 
and will continue to be felt for a long time. Owing 
to the fragility of social security systems, un-
employment does not just mean a decline in 
purchasing power but a sharp plunge into pover-
ty. The hunger in the cities and in the country-
side and the deterioration in health, housing and 
other public services are having irreversible 
effects on the people's health. In short, the crisis 
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has exacerbated dependence, social and econom-
ic disintegration, and inequalities among regions 
and social groups —familiar features of un-
derdevelopment. In other words, it has accentu-
ated the pernicious elements in the existing pat-
terns of development. 
In this respect the crisis has paid little heed to 
the categories in which it was fashionable a little 
while ago to classify the countries of the Third 
World: oil exporters, newly industrialized 
countries, relatively less developed countries. All 
are suffering serious structural damage. If there 
are differences among them, it is not according 
to the categories mentioned above, but according 
to their degree of integration in the economic 
world. In Latin America the most seriously 
affected countries include Argentina and Chile, 
which pursued ultra-liberal policies of in-
discriminate openness to the world. In both these 
countries there are signs of genuine de-in-
dustrialization, with the destruction of whole sec-
tors which in some cases had been established 
many years ago. 
These effects have already been extensively 
analysed. On the other hand, much less attention 
has been given to a point which, to my mind, is 
very important: the effects of the crisis on the 
international political dialogue and on the de-
velopment of ideas. The capacity of the develop-
ing countries to make themselves heard in the 
world is strikingly weak, when compared to the 
period 1973-1980. The collective voice of the 
Third World is no longer heard, as if gov-
ernments had been paralyzed by the fear of pre-
judicing the possible solution of their individual 
situation in the eyes of the creditor countries and 
international Financial bodies. But much could 
be said about the responsibilities implied by the 
present situation and about the permanent valid-
ity of the solutions favoured by the international 
community in the 1970s. The crisis has de-
monstrated not that these solutions are obsolete 
but, on the contrary, that the need to put them 
into effect is even more urgent. 
But this paralysis has affected not only the 
political dialogue but also the development of 
thinking in the economic, social and political 
fields. Even academic and intellectual circles 
seem inhibited by the arrogance of the neoclas-
sical "new orthodoxy". It is paradoxical that 
those most responsible for the situation are man-
aging to impose on their victims, in addition to 
the practical consequences of the crisis, an 
acceptance of their view of what happened. 
From 1984 some more positive signs began 
to appear in this rather bleak picture. At the 
political level, the most important was the hold-
ing of a series of meetings, beginning in January 
with the Latin American Economic Conference 
convened at Quito by the then President of 
Ecuador, Dr. Osvaldo Hurtado. The Declaration 
and Programme of Action adopted at that Con-
ference stressed the need to find collective polit-
ical solutions to the debt problem, with a view to 
spreading the costs of refinancing more equi-
tably. The Quito Declaration also underlined the 
need to go even further and promote co-
operation among the countries of Latin America 
in the search for longer-term structural changes 
in trade, agriculture, industry, etc. This marked 
the revival of a broad debate on the basic issues 
which will determine the region's future and its 
integration in the outside world; and with it 
ECLAC resumes its one-time role as an intellectual 
stimulus and as a place for the exchange of ideas. 
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II 
The prospects for overcoming the crisis in the North 
and at the international level 
The documents which have emerged since that 
Conference properly emphasize that strategies 
for Latin American development must take into 
consideration what is likely to happen in the 
world system, which will have an impact on the 
situation in the region in many ways. It appears 
essential, therefore, to essay an exercise in in-
ternational forecasting, at least conceptually, 
with a view to discussion of ways in which this line 
of reasoning might be expanded and invested 
with a quantitative structure. 
At this point I will limit myself to a critical 
presentation of two hypotheses about the solu-
tion of the crisis which, I think, sum up in broad 
terms the general thinking current in the coun-
tries of the North. 
These hypotheses are not more or less prob-
able forecasts of what is going to happen in the 
countries of the North up to the year 2000. They 
represent merely an attempt to state coherently 
some possible directions that this evolution may 
take, in order to provide the authorities in the 
c o u n t r i e s of the Sou th with a r e fe rence 
framework for study of their own development 
strategies. 
Before presenting the two hypotheses I must 
emphasize that there is no guarantee that the 
international system will find solutions in either 
of them. It is possible that the present con-
tradictions will not be overcome in any lasting 
way, and that phenomena such as worker redun-
dancy and imbalances among sectors and regions 
will persist or that there will be, perhaps, a new 
recession. The situation in Europe tends tó in-
dicate that such a development may take place, 
and that the possibility of another slump in the 
United States should not be dismissed. If this 
happens, divisions among the countries of the 
North, protectionist trends and international 
tensions aggravated by the high level of arms 
expenditures may persist for a long time yet. 
In such circumstances all countries, and even 
more so the developing countries, would un-
dergo a long period of recession and would have 
to devise suitable survival strategies. Without 
wishing to underestimate these possibilities, I 
think it is more interesting to examine solutions 
to the crisis that have in fact been applied with 
some degree of success. This will now be done by 
means of a summary presentation of two hypoth-
eses. 
1. First hypothesis: overcoming the crisis by the 
traditional route of liberal capitalism 
The starting point of this hypothesis is the basic 
assumption that the Reagan Administration's 
economic policies have already brought the Uni-
ted States out of the crisis. The introduction of 
the most modern technologies in the main in-
dustries is making new advances in productivity 
possible after a long period of stagnation. The 
relaxation of the regulations in a number of sec-
tors and the dismantling of the rigid systems of 
the "Welfare State" are injecting enterprises with 
a new energy. Non-inflationary gross product 
growth and a considerable reduction in un-
deremployment are thus being achieved. 
According to this assumption, the continued 
application of these policies will ultimately result 
in a more thorough dismantling of the "Welfare 
State". The market's sphere is being extended to 
social activit ies which were formerly the 
responsibility of the State (health, education, 
communications, postal services, and possibly 
even security services). The scope of capitalist 
accumulation is thus being expanded, and high-
productivity sectors are being integrated with 
mass-consumption sectors. New patterns of con-
sumption are emerging and gradually gaining 
ground, providing reserves of growth for a long 
period to come. This model of growth is accom-
panied by enormous inequalities among regions 
and social groups. 
In this hypothesis, without the counter-
weight of the State and society, the American 
transnational corporations will strengthen their 
power, expand their field of action and increase 
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the number and efficiency of their operations. 
The American State encourages these activities 
in the domestic market and supports them over-
seas. 
The stable and lasting realization of this sce-
nario in the United States presupposes that solu-
tions will be found to the problem of the deficits 
of US$ 200 billion in the federal budget and 
US$ 100 billion in foreign trade which the coun-
try now faces; clearly, this goal will not be easily 
achieved. 
At the international level, the implementa-
tion of this theory requires that the growth model 
and consumption pattern devised in the United 
States should be extended to the other in-
dustrialized countries. It is likely that Europe will 
find it very difficult to make such changes, for 
this would mean the defacto dismantling of the 
traditional social security systems. Such a de-
velopment would provoke tensions and conflicts 
which would have an adverse effect on the com-
petitiveness of European industries and on their 
influence and presence in comparison with the 
United States and Japan at the world level and 
indeed in the European market itself. 
According to this theory, Japan would be a 
privileged partner of the dominant American 
pole, although the introduction of the new model 
would run up against difficulties of a cultural 
kind. Some South-East Asian countries might 
take an active part in the American-Japanese 
model, and the centre of gravity of the world 
economy would shift increasingly towards the 
Pacific area. 
In this situation the international system 
functions without major institutional changes. 
Transnational bodies have a role of limited im-
portance. The monetary system is based on de-
pendence on a strong dollar. In short, it is a world 
existing under the sway of the American trans-
nationals backed up by the political power of the 
United States. 
In the next section consideration will be 
given to ways in which the developing countries 
can devise development strategies on the basis of 
the two hypotheses. It is clear that under the first 
assumption they have very little scope of action to 
resist economic and political domination. The 
prevailing pattern of consumption would con-
tinue to spread to the social groups that have 
adequate incomes. The South's production sys-
tem would participate in the international system 
in the sectors and countries which the trans-
nationals consider advantageous for the 
maximization of their own earnings at the world 
level. Basically, this would mean the traditional 
sectors of mining and agriculture and certain 
basic or labour intensive industrial sectors which 
could be incorporated in the international divi-
sion of labour. It seems inevitable that this sce-
nario will produce more inequalities and im-
balances among the countries of the Third 
World and, within each country, among the sec-
tors incorporated in the world market and those 
left outside it. 
2. Second hypothesis: overcoming the crisis 
by the social democratic route 
It is assumed here that the policy outlined in the 
previous scenario will reach a dead end after 
some years even in the United States, and that 
systems will be sought which offer a better bal-
ance between a flexible capitalism in which the 
transnationals remain strong and States of the 
social democratic type. This would require new 
forms, distinct from the traditional "Welfare 
State", capable of meeting the demands of society 
with efficient public services, achieving a degree 
of redistribution of income among regions and 
social groups and finding innovative solutions to 
the problem of underemployment. The con-
sumption pattern would be somewhat different 
from the one described in the previous hypoth-
esis: there would be greater development of col-
lective services and a different division of time 
between work, community like and leisure. 
Several different patterns might in fact be envis-
aged, some making relatively large use of tradi-
tional goods and services, others being more in-
novative in that the development of society out-
side the market would arrive at growth models 
close to "zero growth". 
At the international level, several variations 
on this theme can be envisaged, depending on 
the geographical spread of this type of solution. 
One would be its extension in various forms to all 
the countries in the North, with shared and bal-
anced management in the international system. 
Another variation would imply a situation of 
greater conflict in that Europe would adapt more 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND LATIN AMERICA/ François Le Quay 131 
easily to systems close to its traditional social 
organization, while the United States would be 
slow to find a suitable solution and would remain 
in a state of crisis for a longer period. 
In any event, these models entail the in-
troduction of counterbalancing forces (the State 
and society) into the market economy. At the 
international level, this would mean strong in-
ternational institutions capable of controlling the 
system in the monetary, financial and trade 
fields. In addition, the necessary conditions 
would be created for the application of measures 
similar to the ones proposed in the Brandt Re-
port and in a number of United Nations resolu-
tions: organization of the commodities markets, 
systems of preferences, increases in the transfer 
of technology, intensive and widespread aid, and 
industrial restructuring at the world level by in-
ternational agreement. 
The question that must be asked here is 
whether, even on the apparently very optimistic 
assumption of the widespread introduction of 
this kind of system, this would mean genuine 
development in the countries of the South. My 
personal opinion is that, unless it is accompanied 
by the implementation of very determined mea-
sures to promote independent development by 
those countries themselves, this type of in-
ternational system, although more beneficial 
than the system described earlier, will not in fact 
attain the objectives set by its advocates. There is 
a very big risk that an international strategy of 
this kind might produce heavy dependence and 
greater inequalities among countries and among 
social groups. Selective integration in the world 
market might lead to increasing internal dis-
locations, marginalization and proletarianization 
in the larger part of the Third World. 
I think that it is appropriate in this connec-
tion to dwell on some of the solutions to the crisis 
based on schemes for a massive increase in 
North-South financial flows, sometimes de-
scribed as a new Marshall Plan for the Third 
World. These schemes emphasize North-South 
interdependence and seek to solve at one and the 
same time the problems of unemployment in the 
North and the lack of investment in the South. 
Before embarking on such plans it would be 
worth analysing what happened in the latter 
years of the 1970s and the first yearsof the 1980s. 
The abundance of liquidity (partly petrodollars) 
in the North combined with the recession to re-
sult in an increase in North-South financial flows 
at much higher levels than in the proposed Mar-
shall Plans. This produced in fact a sharp in-
crease in trade flows (luxury goods, armaments 
and some capital goods) and was very useful for 
the recession-threatened industries of the North. 
But for the South the abundance of funds meant 
competition from imported goods for their 
national industries, mammoth projects, econom-
ic and social disruption and enormous debts. 
CJlearly, interdependence was a one-way street. 
The history of recent years invites us to re-
flect on the shortcomings of solutions based on 
financial transfers. The development difficulties 
encountered by the countries which have the use 
of resources from income (income from oil or 
other sources) offer material for reflection along 
the same lines. 
It is to be hoped that the present analysis of 
the situation will contribute to a clearer aware-
ness that international financing, which for many 
years has been the centrepoint of the whole de-
velopment debate, is in fact a two-edged sword. 
In this connection it is worth mentioning the 
news that the World Bank is "going to have to 
reduce the level of its lending in 1985 owing to 
the lack of demand from the developing coun-
tries. It will be interesting to see whether this 
trend continues in the future. 
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III 
In search of a new model? 
It may be concluded from what has been said 
above that the developing countries need a new 
pattern of development or, to use a term which 
has been current in Latin America in recent 
years, new styles of development. I do not wish at 
this stage to engage in a controversy on the point 
touched on by Enrique Iglesias in his presenta-
tion at the ECLA meeting in Lima in 1984: 
whether it is too early to seek an economic model 
for Latin America (Iglesias, 1984). The analysis 
of the crisis and the exploration of the possible 
effects of the hypotheses described above offer 
instead reasons for re-examining the ideas de-
veloped in the 1970s which, to my mind, have lost 
none of their validity. The neoliberal policies 
pursued under the "new orthodoxy" have de-
monstrated their harmful effects. They have ex-
acerbated inordinately the structural defects of 
dependence, inequality, economic and social dis-
ruption and environmental damage which are 
characteristic of underdevelopment. 
Although the severe restrictions associated 
with indebtedness create more difficult con-
ditions, the need to extricate the developing 
countries from the negative influence of the in-
ternational market now seems more evident than 
ever before. The crisis has placed on the agenda 
the search for strategies of independent, self-
sustained development. These concepts created 
in the 1970s by Third World researchers became 
part of international thinking and debate in the 
middle of that decade. They found public ex-
pression in papers issued by the Hammarskjold 
Foundation or at the Cocoyoc meeting. They also 
appeared in official documents of the United 
Nations system resulting from, for example, the 
sixth special session of the General Assembly 
(May 1974), the Lima Conference on indus-
trialization (March 1975) and the ILO Con-
ference on basic needs (May 1976). 
T h e events of the following ten years have 
not rendered invalid (quite the contrary) the con-
clusions reached at that time, such as, to mention 
just one of them: development is something dis-
tinct from mere economic growth, but it implies 
structural changes. Theses changes will not be 
brought about by the interplay of market forces 
alone; deliberate action to redistribute produc-
tion, risk and power is needed at both the nation-
al and the international levels. 
In the field of industry the international 
community adopted a quantitative target for the 
restructuring of the sector at the world level and 
decided to set up a permanent system of con-
sultation, with a vjew to the adoption of measures 
capable of achieving this restructuring. 
Development implies that basic needs should 
be satisfied as a matter of priority and that 
appropriate policies should be pursued for the 
redistribution of income. 
The essential problem with these develop-
ment strategies is not that they were mistaken but 
that they were not put into practice. Even in 
countries where these principles were pro-
claimed as the theoretical basis of national poli-
cies many contradictions may be noted between 
the principles and the measures actually taken. 
Today, likewise, the countries of the Third 
World are trying to win a degree of inde-
pendence that will let them decide, in accor-
dance with their own development objectives, as 
to their patterns of consumption, the goods they 
produce, the choice of technologies, their in-
vestments and the utilization of their financial 
capacity. This is possible only if at the same time 
they have a certain amount of autonomy as to 
their involvement in the international system and 
the determination of their trade, financial and 
monetary policies. 
Such strategies might appear Utopian in the 
present circumstances. T h e majority of the 
countries will run up against insuperable obsta-
cles if they try to apply them in isolation. But they 
might be more feasible if South-South co-
operation were to be organized in agriculture 
and industry and if suitable institutions were es-
tablished for trade, financial and possibly mone-
tary regulation. Clearly, the international context 
may be favourable to a greater or lesser degree to 
the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of s t rategies of self-
sufficiency. For example, of the ways out of the 
crisis described in the preceding section, solu-
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tions of the second type would make inde-
pendent development a less difficult undertak-
ing than would solutions of the first type. 
In any event, to my way of thinking the pres-
ent problem is not to define a new model but to 
incorporate in the concept of self-sustained de-
velopment an operational content that can take 
material shape in specific decisions or clearly de-
fined measures of economic policy. The content 
of these objectives and their interrelationships 
will obviously have to differ from one country to 
another. In general terms, the most important 
key points, the nucleus of decisions on which the 
effort, the measures and the action will be con-
centrated must be sought out in each individual 
case. By way of illustration, I would mention 
certain key points which appear to be of im-
portance in the majority of the countries of Latin 
America: 
—Achievement of food self-sufficiency. This 
point relates to the objectives of breaking free 
from dependence, modifying patterns of con-
sumption, meeting essential needs, etc. It con-
cerns the rural sector, which would have to be 
thoroughly restructured. It also affects foreign 
relations (position on world agribusiness, in-
te rna t iona l co-operat ion) , industrialization 
strategy, countrytown relationships, etc. To give 
this objective maximum priority, not just on pa-
per but by setting in motion a concrete process 
with targets and dates, could mark a funda-
mental redirection of economic and social policy 
as whole; 
—Definition of the process of industrializa-
tion starting with an indigenous nucleus (Fajnzyl-
Planning, which thrived in the 1970s in both 
Europe and Latin America, has since gone 
through a long period of decline. It may seem 
paradoxical to wish to revive it in much more 
difficult times, when uncertainty about the fu-
ture is at a peak and governments are under 
continual pressure to take urgent, very short-
term decisions. I think, however, that while times 
of crisis make things more difficult, they also 
ber, 1983) and proceeding via a progressive 
dynamics of increasing independence. This im-
plies not only production targets and investment 
programmes but also policies and institutional 
systems to control the import of technology (cf. 
Mexican policy in the 1970s and decision 24 of 
the Andean Pact), research and technical train-
ing institutes, capital goods production projects, 
etc. ; it also means the horizontal integration of all 
sectoral activities; 
—Integration of modern technology enter-
prises with traditional enterprises in the farming 
and industrial sectors. The deterioration in this 
integration is a major cause of underdevelop-
ment, social and regional inequalities and the 
transformation of modern enterprises into "en-
clávese of the international system. Progress in 
this area will require not only the adoption of 
domestic measures for each sector but also strict 
control of external relations, greater concentra-
tion on the domestic market, price control, the 
adopt ion of fiscal incentives, training pro-
grammes, etc. 
In citing these examples it was not my inten-
tion to embark on an analysis of each of the topics 
but to indicate that they are not of merely sectoral 
scope, requiring fragmented attention. Each of 
them combines external with internal elements, 
horizontal with vertical aspects, and sectoral 
measures with global and institutional ones. 
The desire to inject a concrete content into 
objectives which often have remained fixed in 
the past from the conceptual or even rhetorical 
standpoints entails contemplation of new forms 
of planning and co-operation. 
make them more necessary. Since governments 
need to solve the immediate problems and at the 
same time devise new strategies, they are com-
pelled to conceive planning systems with re-
newed institutions, processes and methods. 
I shall offer some suggestions in this connec-
tion, based on a critical examination of the 
methods devised in earlier periods. Clearly, these 
methods were not entirely in tune with the logical 
IV 
New forms of planning (Le Guay, 1984) 
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conclusions that flow from the proclaimed prin-
ciples concerning the nature of underdevelop-
ment and the strategies needed to overcome it. 
Many of the plans did not give a concrete content 
to the declared principle that development is 
something more than economic growth; and in 
fact the objectives were limited to the achieve-
ment of the fastest possible growth. 
The technical instruments used mostly suf-
fer from the same limitations: the models of op-
timum global effect relate to the national or sec-
toral levels; the cost-benefit analyses of the proj-
ects are aimed at maximum product output, i.e., 
an arithmetic and not a structural goal. 
In order to overcome this dichotomy, it is not 
enough to include in the objectives figures for 
gross domestic product, production rates or in-
vestment levels. A practical content must be 
given to concepts such as "styles of develop-
ment", the theory of which has made progress in 
Latin America in recent years. This is to say that 
there is an interrelationship among the different 
aspects of a strategy: consumption patterns, in-
come structure, sectoral integration, choice of 
technology, external relations and cultural iden-
tity. Thus, the planning system, the process of 
compilation of the plans, the technical tools used 
and the planning institutions must be organized 
accordingly. 
And so, it is a question of conceiving and 
constructing a planning system which effectively 
helps the process of making decisions on the 
complicated matters mentioned above, in-
corporating multiple objectives which cannot 
readily be traded off against each other; more-
over, this system must be flexible, capable of 
rapid adaptation to the sudden changes that can 
affect domestic or foreign conditions. I will limit 
myself to some thoughts about the characteristics 
of such systems. 
1. Integration of time horizons 
For a long time planning systems gave priority to 
the compilation of medium-term plans. What is 
needed today is planning that is at once more 
strategic and more operational, i.e., that achieves 
a closer integration of the structural objectives, 
which are usually of long-term effect (15 or 20 
years), with decisions involving the inherent mea-
sures of economic policy, which are taken today. 
To this end, I think it important to extend the 
planning tools in both directions: towards the 
long-term and towards the short-term. 
In the long-term this means devising 
forecasting tools capable of making projections 
to the end of the century on the state of the world 
system and the consequences of national and re-
gional strategies. This includes quantitative 
forecasting, which is the only means of ensuring 
a minimum degree of consistency in the evolu-
tion of various magnitudes. That does not mean 
that the long-term plan should have the same 
categories and the same details as the short-term 
one. 
These forecasting tools should facilitate the 
study of the consequences of alternative strate-
gies in the light of a number of different assump-
tions about the future of the international sys-
tem. It would be a great help for the purposes of 
studying the effectiveness of the exercise and the 
possibilities for co-operation among the coun-
tries of Latin America if the various countries 
could agree on common assumptions about the 
international situation. It would then be possible 
to compare strategies and collate their points of 
compatibility. This would be a first step, taken 
bilaterally or regionally, towards the harmoniza-
tion of strategies. 
In parallel with extension towards the long 
term it is very important in the present circum-
stances to devise tools for the permanent im-
plementation of the plans which can adapt swiftly 
to the changes that occur in the international or 
domestic situations. Experience with annual op-
erational plans (sometimes also called economic 
estimates) is very helpful in this connection, 
although in the present situation other difficul-
ties do arise. Very sudden changes can take place 
in inflation rates, the balance of payments, the 
level of unemployment and interest rates; it is 
very difficult, therefore, to assess consumption 
performance, savings, investment, and the pro-
duction decisions made necessary by these 
changes. 
Various practical consequences may be in-
ferred from the foregoing: 
—The need for a much more dextrous sys-
tem for the collection, dissemination and analysis 
of the economic information required for the 
decision-making process; 
—The creation of forecasting tools suited to 
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situations which are very different from those of 
the past removes much of the validity of models 
based on the relations of historical behaviour. 
—The importance of closer co-ordination 
among the institutions which participate in eco-
nomic-policy decisions and, accordingly, in the 
preparation of the annual plans which assist that 
process (in particular, planning and financial 
bodies and central banks). 
2. Integration of overall planning 
with sectoral planning 
In t radi t ional planning methods the in-
terrelationship between overall planning and the 
planning of the various sectors was often weak 
both conceptually and with regard to institutions. 
Overall planning provides a fairly rough outline 
of the general demand structure. In fact, the 
planning of each sector is carried out almost 
independently in each of the ministries con-
cerned; in the highly intensive sectors the big 
enterprises have an important role, and the 
national plan is rarely a joint and more or less 
co-ordinated presentation of the outlook for pro-
ducers. 
An instructive example of this is provided by 
the energy sector, in which planning is some-
times limited to the oil and electricity subsectors. 
In many countries, on the recommendation of 
the World Bank, energy-planning exercises are 
carried out outside the context of overall plan-
ning. 
Inevitably, these sectoral or subsectoral plans 
are concerned only with maximizing the partial 
product, in accordance with criteria of maximum 
output applicable to a single sector or sometimes 
to the enterprise responsible for a single sub-
sector. Thus, the lack of integration of Latin 
American economies grows worse, and harmful 
external effects are multiplied. As we saw earlier, 
the objectives of genuine development do not 
relate to one sector alone but to several sectors, 
and to the links among them —a factor which 
should be taken into account in sectoral planning 
methods and in the organization of sectoral 
planning institutions. The studies undertaken 
and the decision-making process should enable a 
choice to be made from among alternative solu-
tions which, while still offering promise from the 
standpoint of the sector concerned, also have 
indirect positive effects on the general objectives 
and the development of other sectors. 
To take the example of energy planning a 
step further, the planning methods would have 
to avoid a repetition of the mistakes made earlier 
in many countries, when energy systems were 
constructed which were unsuited either to the 
users' needs or to the countries' resources. This 
would mean including in the planning process 
decisions on the use and management of the 
energy and not just on the sector's production 
a n d i n v e s t m e n t . I t would also mean 
counterbalancing the present dominant role of 
oil in countries which do not have their own 
resources by promoting other national energy 
sources. 
Only methods which go beyond optimization 
models or cost-benefit analyses can facilitate 
rational decisions on such complex problems as, 
for example, electrification as the basis for the 
development of a national capital goods in-
dustry, the study of the positive and negative 
effects of a programme for the use of certain 
crops for energy (Proalcohol), and overcoming 
the harmful effects of oil income on the social 
and economic systems of the producer countries, 
etc. 
3. The harmonization process 
Planning in Latin America has been criticized 
for being too bureaucratic and producing plans 
drawn up without consultation of the social 
groups concerned, plans which therefore have 
little practical influence on the subsequent op-
eration of economic policy. 
The happy revival of democratic govern-
ment in the majority of the countries offers an 
opportunity for renovation of planning systems 
and incorporation in them of a machinery for 
consulting social groups. This is even more 
necessary in the present difficult situation, when 
the mistakes of the economic policies of the past 
—and their most visible consequence, debt— are 
going to mortgage the future development of the 
countries for many years. However, if gov-
ernments are to devise long-term, independent 
strategies and defend them against external pres-
sures, they must have the broadest possible 
domestic support. The compilation of medium-
or long-term national plans by means of a process 
136 CEP AL REVIEW No. 26/Augwt 1985 
of consultation and agreement can help a coun- aspirations and alleviate conflicts which seem in-
try to find a point of convergence of different superable in the short term. 
V 
New forms of co-operation 
As in the case of planning, the theme of co-
operation among developing countries, and 
more specifically of regional co-operation in 
Latin America, at one time awakened great 
hopes, which were followed by many disap-
pointments. It is not possible in this paper to 
analyse the advances and retreats of the various 
regional and subregional schemes in Latin 
America. Political developments in some of the 
countries of the continent and indeed the wave of 
ultra-liberal policies certainly had harmful 
effects. The South-South co-operation effort 
loses much of its purpose if development is 
sought by means of indiscriminate involvement 
in the world market. Sometimes even foreign 
enterprises can have more of the strength and 
flexibility needed to take advantage of the 
favourable provisions of certain treaties of in-
tegration. 
On the other hand, if the road taken is the 
one that leads to self-sustained development, re-
gional and subregional co-operation regain all 
their importance. There is a wealth of legal texts, 
institutional structures and accumulated ex-
perience at both regional and subregional levels. 
It would be very useful to make a historical and 
critical analysis of the various schemes and iden-
tify the causes of their failure with a view to the 
proposal of innovatory measures which will 
make it possible for new strategies to be put into 
practice. At this stage I would advance one single 
idea: there was no shortage of concepts, ideas, 
texts or studies, or even in some cases of in-
stitutions and qualified staff; what was lacking 
were development strategies capable of taking 
advantage of those elements. The instruments of 
co-operation among countries lose their ef-
fectiveness unless the countries decide at the 
same time to establish commoripositions towards 
the outside world. I will give just one example: 
the celebrated decision 24 of the Cartagena 
Agreement. It contains all the elements for effi-
cient industrial co-operation that extends be-
yond the trade and financial aspects and aims at 
common industrial and technological policies. Its 
defect lies not in its conception but in the fact that 
it has never been put into practice. It might re-
gain its relevance if the member countries agreed 
to determine jointly their mode of integration in 
the international market and their long-term de-
velopment plans. With regard to the Latin Amer-
ican region I would simply like to mention two 
documents which concern important sectors and 
which might also prove to be useful tools in the 
present circumstances. 
In the case of industry I would recall the 
Latin American Conference on Industrializa-
tion, attended by industry ministers at Mexico 
City in November 1974. In accordance with the 
recommendation of the sixth special session of 
the United Nations General Assembly and look-
ing forward to the Lima Conference which took 
place a few months later, the Conference 
adopted a quantitative objective for Latin Amer-
ican industry within the world framework and 
affirmed, inter alia, the principle that the un-
controlled operation of market forces is not the 
most suitable means of promoting industrializa-
tion and that agreements on industrial co-
operation between governments and enterprises 
should be worked out with assistance from the 
United Nations system. 
At the regional level, too, the Conference 
proposed objectives for harmonization and co-
ordination of industrial policies, for specializa-
tion and complementary arrangements, and for 
the strengthening of existing integration plans 
and the search for new forms. It resolved to 
adopt measures for the harmonization and co-
ordination of investment policies (national and 
foreign), technological development, scientific 
and technological co-operation, and protection 
of export prices. It approved the principle of 
Latin American transnational enterprises, agree-
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ments on complementary arrangements and a 
regional imports system. It commissioned the re-
gional organizations, especially ECEAC, to evolve 
study and promotion activities to contribute to 
the implementation of the measures adopted. 
After the passage of ten years it must be 
admitted that little has been done to give effect to 
these excellent ideas. Governments were unable 
to invest the principles which they themselves 
had proclaimed with a concrete political content. 
Neither ECLAC nor SEI.A, a recent creation at the 
time, took advantage of the favourable circum-
stances and the clear mandate they had been 
given to undertake determined action to pro-
mote industrial co-operation. 
T h e difficulties resulting from the crisis, 
provided that an adequate analysis is made of 
their causes, may stimulate the Latin American 
countries to adopt new styles of industrial de-
velopment, starting from the indigenous nuclei 
which exist in several parts of the continent. If 
that happens, industrial co-operation activities 
along the lines devised ten years ago can multiply 
the opportunities and accelerate the process. 
T h e energy field also possesses possibilities 
for co-operation which have not been fully uti-
lized. One very interesting initiative is the San 
José Agreement between the oil-producing 
countries (Mexico and Venezuela) and the oil-
importing countries of Central America and the 
Caribbean. This Agreement links the supplying 
of oil to the financing of development projects, 
especially in the energy field. Without embark-
ing on a detailed analysis of the implementation 
of the Agreement, it must be noted that despite 
its positive points it has recently shown a tenden-
cy to slow down. It should also be noted that the 
latest renegotiation has resulted in conditions 
less favourable to the recipient countries. 
T h e Latin American Programme for Energy 
Co-operation (PEACE), approved in 1981 by 25 
countries within the framework of OEAUE, is 
more ambitious. Its aim is to develop among the 
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countries a common strategic view of the provi-
sion of energy, promote unified and lasting ac-
tions and encourage co-operation in all areas of 
scientific and technological capacity, prospecting 
and exploration, and training, PLACE seeks to go 
beyond the exchange of information, the con-
duct of joint studies and research, and technical 
co-operation; it is proposing the establishment of 
joint industries, in particular a Latin American 
capital goods and equipment industry for the 
energy sector. 
After th ree years in existence, PEACE'S 
achievements have been somewhat disappoint-
ing. Projects are under way on only a limited 
scale. For the most part they consist of studies, 
training and technical assistance. The concrete 
projects concern individual countries and are not 
helping to develop joint productive capacities in 
several countries together. It has to be asked 
whether since adopting the programme, gov-
ernments have really demonstrated the will to 
put it into operation. But it may also be noted that 
the OLADE secretariat has devoted a major effort 
to technical and methodological work (such as 
energy balances, methods of forecasting supply 
and demand, training seminars, etc.), fields in 
which several research institutes are already op-
erating efficiently in Latin America. Meanwhile, 
the political task of promoting joint projects and 
enterprises among member governments has 
been neglected. Nevertheless, these possibilities 
remain open, and for many reasons the energy 
sector is one which lends itself well to rapid pro-
gress in the mat ter of Latin American co-
operation. 
This paper expresses the conviction that de-
spite the predominance of the current ideology 
—the new orthodoxy— the time is very ripe for 
some deep thinking about a new stage in Latin 
American development. The presence of de-
mocratic governments in the majority of the 
countries and the search for a new direction that 
has become evident, particularly since the Quito 
meeting, testify to this possibility. 
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